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SYMMETRY AND (NETWORK) NEUTRALITY 
Tejas N. Narechania* 
Review of Daniel E. Walters, Symmetry’s Mandate: Constraining the 
Politicization of American Administrative Law, 119 MICH. L. REV. 
455 (2020). 
INTRODUCTION 
In Symmetry’s Mandate, Daniel Walters constructs a compelling account 
of a difference between theory and practice in administrative law.1 In recent 
years, several scholars have criticized doctrines, such as Chevron, granting 
agencies substantial power to make regulatory policy or adjudicate regulato-
ry claims—seemingly, in their view, at the expense of Congress and the judi-
ciary.2 And these scholars have found an audience in the courts, with some 
notable jurists issuing opinions echoing these critiques.3 But Symmetry’s 
Mandate finds something that may have been lost in the transition from 
scholarship to doctrine. While many scholars’ arguments against administra-
tive governance sound in separation-of-powers concerns—concerns that 
would seem to apply across both “regulatory” and “deregulatory” agency ac-
tion—the doctrinal implementation of these ideas has demonstrated serious 
concern for possible agency overregulation while evincing little regard for 
possible agency underregulation.4 In Walters’s terms, these cases seem to 
tolerate a range of Type II errors (deregulatory errors, or errors in which 
agencies “fail[] to operationalize statutes”) while remaking administrative 
law doctrine to address Type I errors (regulatory errors, or errors in which 
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 1. Daniel E. Walters, Symmetry’s Mandate: Constraining the Politicization of American 
Administrative Law, 119 MICH. L. REV. 455 (2020). 
 2. See, e.g., PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? (2014); see gen-
erally Gillian E. Metzger, The Supreme Court, 2016 Term—Foreword: 1930s Redux: The Admin-
istrative State Under Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1, 31–33 (2017) (describing such scholarship). 
 3. See, e.g., Baldwin v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 690, 690–95 (2020) (mem.) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting from the denial of certiorari); Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149–58 
(10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
 4. Walters does, to be sure, criticize both courts and scholars, finding that the scholarly 
literature contains a “telling silence” regarding deregulatory errors that suggests an “operation-
al[] bias[] toward remedying only one kind of error in the implementation of statutes.” Wal-
ters, supra note 1, at 486. 
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agencies take action beyond the statute’s intended scope).5 And he concludes 
that such asymmetry both undermines administrative law’s coherence and 
injects political and partisan considerations into the judicial review of agency 
action.6 
In this short Essay, I take the opportunity to highlight one further po-
tential asymmetry that may yet emerge from the Supreme Court’s applica-
tion of Chevron’s many doctrines. Drawing on then-Judge Kavanaugh’s dis-
dissental from the D.C. Circuit’s decision affirming network neutrality rules, 
I suggest that there is at least one vote on the Supreme Court—and perhaps 
more—for an asymmetric approach to the major questions doctrine.7 More-
over, I demonstrate how asymmetry in this context is deeply irrational. As 
applied to network neutrality, the asymmetry has at least one of two effects. 
One, it might simply favor one large industry over another, subjecting one 
inter-sector wealth transfer to heightened scrutiny, while treating an analo-
gous wealth transfer—in the opposite direction—deferentially. But the judi-
ciary is not typically in the business of favoring one industrial sector over 
another.8 Two, it subjects consumer-protection devices to increased regula-
tory scrutiny, thereby shifting the costs and burdens of overcoming a regula-
tory default to those entities—consumers—who can likely least afford to bear 
them. Hence, in more general terms, Justice Kavanaugh’s unbalanced ap-
proach to the major questions doctrine tends to undermine many of the val-
ues—accountability and expertise, among others—that agency policymaking 
has long served.9 
I. ASYMMETRY AND THE MAJOR QUESTIONS DOCTRINE 
A. Asymmetry and Chevron 
In Symmetry’s Mandate, Daniel Walters identifies an asymmetry in the 
development of a range of administrative law doctrines—scrutiny for agency 
nonenforcement (vis-à-vis judicial review of enforcement actions), or for or-
ders denying petitions for rulemaking (vis-à-vis judicial review of agency 
 
 5. Id. at 484. 
 6. Id. at 516. 
 7. U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC (USTA II), 855 F.3d 381, 417–26 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Ka-
vanaugh, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc). Justice Kavanaugh’s express en-
dorsement of an asymmetric approach to the major questions doctrine seems to have been 
largely overlooked in the still-growing literature regarding that doctrine. One notable excep-
tion includes Daniel Deacon, Judge Kavanaugh and “Weaponized Administrative Law,” YALE J. 
ON REGUL.: NOTICE & COMMENT (July 11, 2018), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/judge-
kavanaugh-and-weaponized-administrative-law-by-daniel-deacon/ [https://perma.cc/8GJJ-
LCPF] 
 8. See, e.g., Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 
2118, 2120 (2016) (reviewing ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014)) (“[O]ne 
overarching goal is to make judging a neutral, impartial process in all cases . . . .”). 
 9. See Mila Sohoni, King’s Domain, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1419, 1437–39 (2018). 
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rulemaking)—that seems to disfavor regulation for deregulation (and non-
regulation) and thereby destabilizes administrative law’s coherence and con-
tinuity (and perhaps legitimacy) across presidential administrations. Among 
Walters’s examples is Chevron.10 Chevron, of course, is a multipartite doc-
trine, and one typical hornbook account of Chevron follows three steps, 
numbered zero through two.11 First, at Step Zero, a reviewing court consid-
ers whether Congress has granted the agency the authority to administer a 
statutory program by issuing decisions carrying the force of law.12 If so, then 
the court moves on to consider Chevron’s Steps One and Two: 
 When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it 
administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the ques-
tion whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. 
If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, 
as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed in-
tent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not di-
rectly addressed the precise question at issue . . . the question for the court 
is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the 
statute.13 
Walters focuses specifically on Chevron’s Step Two (requiring courts to as-
sess the reasonableness of an agency’s construction and to defer to any rea-
sonable agency construction), finding that “critics of Chevron seem skeptical 
that it applies with as much force when agencies commit [a potential] Type 
II error” through underregulation but seem less skeptical in cases presenting 
the possibility of Type I error through overregulation.14 
As an example, Walters emphasizes Justice Thomas’s recent reconsider-
ation of his majority opinion in Brand X as proof of this asymmetry in prac-
tice.15 In Brand X, the Supreme Court affirmed the Federal Communications 
Commission’s decision to treat cable modem service—the broadband inter-
net access service sold by cable companies—as beyond its regulatory pow-
ers.16 But as the Commission has more recently exercised the flexibility 
accorded to it by Chevron to reregulate (and re-deregulate) broadband car-
 
 10. Walters, supra note 1, at 495–96. 
 11. See Tejas N. Narechania, Defective Patent Deference, 95 WASH. L. REV. 869, 880 
(2020). But see Daniel J. Hemel & Aaron L. Nielson, Chevron Step One-and-a-Half, 84 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 757, 759–60 (2017) (collecting descriptions of Chevron that range from one step to 
four). 
 12. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229–31 (2001); see also Thomas W. 
Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 873–89 (2001); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 188 (2006). 
 13. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984) 
(footnotes omitted). 
 14. See Walters, supra note 1, at 495. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005). 
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riage by, say, imposing (and then later rescinding) network neutrality rules,17 
Justice Thomas has—consistent with his more recent criticisms of Chevron—
signaled some willingness to revisit his own majority opinion in Brand X.18 
In Walters’s view, this inconsistency seems outcome-driven: He suggests that 
“one might . . . reasonably question whether Justice Thomas’s new thinking 
about the limits of interpretive maneuvers by agencies will extend to cases,” 
like the Commission’s decision to re-deregulate broadband carriers, “that 
introduce [the possibility for] Type II error.”19 
I agree that Justice Thomas has signaled a deep skepticism of Chevron 
and Brand X, and that his skepticism may well be more likely to manifest in 
a decision addressing a putative Type I error.20 For now, however, I aim to 
shift focus to a different aspect of Chevron and to a different member of the 
Court—namely, to Step Zero and to Justice Kavanaugh. 
B. Asymmetry and the Major Questions Doctrine 
As noted, I focus here on Chevron’s Step Zero and, in particular, the ma-
jor questions doctrine.21 While there is some dispute over the doctrine’s pre-
cise contours, its basic premise is simple: Some matters are so important—so 
major—that Congress would not have delegated policymaking authority to 
an agency over such matters without saying so explicitly. In MCI v. AT&T, 
one of the earliest examples of the doctrine, the Court concluded that the 
Commission’s power to “modify” rate regulations did not encompass the 
power to eliminate them entirely, reasoning that it was “highly unlikely” that 
Congress would delegate to an agency the power to decide whether an entire 
industry should or should not be subject to rate regulation.22 More recently, 
 
 17. See, respectively, U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC (USTA I), 825 F.3d 674 (D.C. Cir. 2016), 
and Mozilla Corp. v. FCC, 940 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2019). 
 18. Baldwin v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 690, 690–91 (2020) (mem.) (Thomas, J., dissent-
ing from the denial of certiorari) (“Although I authored Brand X, ‘it is never too late to “sur-
rende[r] former views to a better considered position” ’ . . . . My skepticism of Brand X begins 
at its foundation—Chevron deference.” (first alteration in original) (quoting South Dakota v. 
Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2100 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring))). 
 19. Walters, supra note 1, at 495. 
 20. But cf. Lipschultz v. Charter Advanced Servs. (MN), LLC, 140 S. Ct. 6, 7 (2019) 
(mem.) (Thomas, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari) (finding it “doubtful [that] a federal 
policy . . . of nonregulation . . . is ‘Law’ for purposes of the Supremacy Clause” and, hence, 
preemptive of state regulation). 
 21. Sunstein, supra note 12, at 236 (describing the major questions doctrine as a Step 
Zero doctrine). There is, to be sure, some controversy over the major questions doctrine’s true 
place in Chevron’s framework. See, e.g., Christopher J. Walker, Toward a Context-Specific 
Chevron Deference, 81 MO. L. REV. 1095, 1101 (2016). I can safely set aside such questions for 
my present purposes. My analysis does not turn on the doctrine’s precise place in Chevron’s 
larger framework. 
 22. MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218, 225–26, 231 (1994). Congress would 
later grant the FCC such power in express terms. See Daniel T. Deacon, Administrative For-
bearance, 125 YALE L.J. 1548, 1569 (2016) (“The FCC’s decades-long efforts to alter the Com-
munications Act’s requirements in the face of newly emerging competition—culminating in 
50 Michigan Law Review Online [Vol. 119:46 
Chief Justice Roberts explained in King v. Burwell that if “Congress wished 
to assign” a “question of deep ‘economic and political significance’ ” “to an 
agency, it surely would have done so expressly.”23 Finding no such express 
delegation of policymaking power, the Court declined there to apply Chev-
ron’s framework.24 
Can the status of a question—as either major or not—turn on its answer? 
Based on his views as a member of the Courts of Appeals for the D.C. Cir-
cuit, Justice Kavanaugh seems to think so. Explaining how this is so requires 
a brief detour into the regulatory history of network neutrality (or, colloqui-
ally, net neutrality). 
1. Network Neutrality 
As I noted above, the Commission decided, in 2002, to treat cable mo-
dem–based internet access as beyond most of its regulatory powers. It ac-
complished this by reclassifying the service an “information service.”25 The 
Commission’s regulatory powers under the Telecommunications Act of 
1996 depend, in part, on the type of service it seeks to regulate—
“information service” or “telecommunications service,” among other regula-
tory classifications. The differences between the telecommunications service 
and the information-service designations are vast.26 “Classified as a []tele-
communications service,[] a communications offering may be subject to the 
full panoply of the [Commission’s] regulatory power—rate regulation, ser-
vice specification, and more.”27 By contrast, information services are largely 
beyond the Commission’s reach.28 
The Commission’s decision to choose the information-service designa-
tion was premised, however, on the mistaken impression that, such deregu-
lation notwithstanding, it would nevertheless retain some ancillary powers to 
require broadband carriers to comply with network neutrality rules—rules 
that, among other things, prevent carriers from blocking or unreasonably 
inhibiting consumers’ access to lawful internet content.29 In short, network 
 
the Commission’s defeat in MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T—is what initially prompted Con-
gress to enact the 1996 Telecommunications Act’s forbearance provision.” (footnote omitted)). 
 23. 576 U.S. 473, 486 (2015) (quoting Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324 
(2014)). 
 24. King, 576 U.S. at 486 (“This is not a case for the IRS. It is instead our task to deter-
mine the correct reading [of the statute].”). 
 25. Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet over Cable and Other Facili-
ties, 17 FCC Rcd. 4798, 4802 (2002) [hereinafter Cable Modem Order] (Declaratory Rule and 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking). 
 26. 47 U.S.C. § 153(24), (50), (53). 
 27. Tejas N. Narechania, The Secret Life of a Text Message, 120 COLUM. L. REV. F. 197, 
209 (2020). 
 28. See Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 649 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 29. See, e.g., Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wire-
line Facilities, 20 FCC Rcd. 14986 (2005) [hereinafter Internet Freedoms Policy Statement] 
(Policy Statement). 
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neutrality rules require that broadband carriers—companies like AT&T, 
Comcast, and Verizon—treat like internet traffic alike, without prioritizing 
favored providers (including affiliated companies), blocking disfavored ones, 
or otherwise demanding fees for delivering internet content to its destina-
tion.30 Former Federal Communications Commission Chairman Michael 
Powell explained that such rules offered “an insurance policy against the po-
tential rise of abusive market power by vertically integrated providers.”31 
Moreover, then-Chairman Powell explained that these rules would “empow-
er American consumers” and give “[p]ower to the [p]eople” by ensuring that 
they remained free from broadband carrier “interference.”32 But the Com-
mission was wrong about its power to enforce such network neutrality rules 
under the information-service paradigm.33 
Hence, in 2015, the Commission decided to revisit its classification deci-
sion, concluding that broadband carriage was now better characterized as a 
telecommunications service and that, given this new classification, the 
Commission might finally promulgate enforceable network neutrality obli-
gations in service of these competition and consumer-protection goals.34 It 
was correct: The Commission’s decision to reclassify the broadband carriage 
also conferred the power to enforce network neutrality rules against the new-
ly designated telecommunications services that it could not apply to infor-
mation services.35 
2. Network Neutrality and the Major Questions Doctrine 
It may seem odd that the Commission can so easily change its mind 
about the statutory classification of a service, thereby dramatically altering 
the scope of its regulatory powers over that service. But this is precisely the 
approach that the Supreme Court endorsed in its 2005 Brand X decision, 
reasoning (consistent with Chevron itself) that agencies could best draw up-
on specialized technical and legal expertise and be held to account for their 
policy choices by political leaders and the voting public.36 As noted above, 
 
 30. See generally Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. ON 
TELECOMMS. & HIGH TECH. L. 141 (2003). 
 31. Michael K. Powell, Preserving Internet Freedom: Guiding Principles for the Industry, 
3 J. ON TELECOMMS. & HIGH TECH. L. 5, 12 (2004). 
 32. Id. at 6–7, 11. 
 33. E.g., Comcast Corp., 600 F.3d 642; Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 34. Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601, 5644, 5763–65 
(2015) [hereinafter Open Internet Order] (Report and Order on Remand, Declaratory Ruling, 
and Order). 
 35. U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC (USTA I), 825 F.3d 674 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
 36. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981 (2005) 
(explaining that agencies “must consider varying interpretations and the wisdom of its policy 
on a continuing basis,” including “in response to changed factual circumstances, or a change in 
administrations” (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
863–64 (1984))); see id. at 1002–03 (explaining that “[t]he questions the Commission resolved 
in the order under review involve a ‘subject matter [that] is technical, complex, and dynamic’ ” 
52 Michigan Law Review Online [Vol. 119:46 
Brand X affirmed the Commission’s Cable Modem Order, which placed ca-
ble modem service largely beyond its regulatory ambit.37 
Before the Cable Modem Order, the Commission treated most broad-
band carriers—consistent with both agency and judicial precedent—as tele-
communications service providers.38 But broadband internet access offered 
over cable television wires was new and thus did not obviously fall inside any 
existing regulated service.39 Hence, finding sufficient ambiguity in the statu-
tory definitions of these competing services, the Court agreed in Brand X 
that the Commission may reasonably conclude that broadband carriage was 
an “information service” largely immune to Commission regulation.40 
As I noted above, the Commission sought to undo this decision one 
decade later. The Commission’s reasoning rested heavily on intervening 
changes in the market for broadband carriage41—and also on Brand X. The 
Supreme Court’s opinion there, after all, seemed to suggest that either classi-
fication—information service or telecommunications service—might be a 
reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute.42 And in view of new 
market conditions, the Commission concluded that the telecommunications 
service classification was a better fit.43 
The broadband carriers’ challenge to the Commission’s Order setting 
out this new classification and promulgating concomitant network neutrality 
rules failed on Brand X’s terms.44 In USTA v. FCC, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the D.C. Circuit explained that the Supreme Court’s decision in Brand X 
practically compelled a decision in favor of the Commission: Brand X con-
cluded that the statute was ambiguous; Brand X suggested that either classi-
 
and that “[t]he Commission is in a far better position to address these questions” than the 
courts (second alteration in original) (quoting Nat’l Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n Inc. v. 
Gulf Power, Co., 534 U.S. 327, 339 (2002))). 
 37. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 976. 
 38. See Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline 
Facilities, 20 FCC Rcd. 14853 (2005) (Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking) 
(explaining that DSL had been traditionally treated as a telecommunications service before this 
reclassification order); see also Brand X, 545 U.S. at 1000 (noting the regulatory classification of 
DSL). 
 39. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n, Inc. v. Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S. 327, 347 
(2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (calling on the Commission to 
make a classification decision, and concluding that cable-based internet access might even fall 
within the “cable service” classification). But see Tejas N. Narechania & Tim Wu, Sender Side 
Transmission Rules for the Internet, 66 FED. COMMC’NS L.J. 467, 488 (2014) (concluding that 
the better interpretative view is one that treats broadband carriage as a telecommunications 
service). I continue to believe that this is the better interpretative view, though I agree that the 
statutory definitions of these classifications are ambiguous and merit deference under Chevron. 
 40. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 987–89. 
 41. Open Internet Order, supra note 34, at 5743–44. 
 42. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 981. 
 43. Open Internet Order, supra note 34, at 5745. 
 44. U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC (USTA I), 825 F.3d 674, 700–01 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
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fication was reasonable; and the Commission’s factual analysis of new mar-
ket conditions adequately explained its revised conclusion.45 
But, on a petition for rehearing en banc, then-Judge Kavanaugh dissent-
ed, suggesting that Brand X did not supply the relevant standard. Instead, 
Kavanaugh contended that the relevant question arose at Chevron’s Step Ze-
ro. Chevron, recall, does not apply to questions of deep “economic and polit-
ical significance.”46 And Kavanaugh contended that, though the 2002 Cable 
Modem Order at issue in Brand X entailed mere “light-touch regulation” 
that constituted only “an ordinary rule, not a major rule,” the Commission’s 
2015 Open Internet Order was a “major rule” not expressly authorized by 
Congress.47 Hence, though Chevron’s framework applied in Brand X, he con-
tended that it could not sustain the Commission’s actions under review in 
USTA. In his view, the Commission’s network neutrality rules purported to 
regulate a significant aspect of the domestic economy (namely, broadband 
carriage), and agencies may issue such rules of economic significance only 
when clearly authorized to do so. So, the Commission was not clearly au-
thorized to issue these rules: “Brand X’s finding of ambiguity by definition 
means that Congress has not clearly authorized the FCC to issue the net neu-
trality rule. And that means that the net neutrality rule is unlawful under the 
major rules doctrine.”48 
In short, then-Judge Kavanaugh suggested that whether a question is 
major turns on the agency’s response. The Commission was asked, repeated-
ly, to resolve the status of broadband internet access.49 When it answered 
 
 45. Id.; see also Brand X, 545 U.S. at 1001 n.4 (“Any inconsistency [over time] bears on 
whether the Commission has given a reasoned explanation for its current position, not on 
whether its interpretation is consistent with the statute.”). 
 46. U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC (USTA II), 855 F.3d 381, 417 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Ka-
vanaugh, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc). 
 47. Id. at 425–26 n.5. Importantly, Judge Kavanaugh’s characterization of the Commis-
sion’s 2002 Order is rather incomplete, overlooking the Commission’s (mistaken) belief that it 
could continue to enforce network neutrality norms under the information-service classifica-
tion it then promulgated. That is, even in 2002, the Commission understood its rule as entail-
ing “common-carrier regulation” of the exact same “vast economic and political significance” 
as the 2015 Order. Compare id. (suggesting that the Cable Modem Order was an example of 
mere “light-touch regulation”), with Internet Freedoms Policy Statement, supra note 29 (ex-
plaining that the Commission intended to enforce network neutrality obligations on broad-
band carriers classified information-services providers). And the Court’s 2005 decision in 
Brand X predates any other decision suggesting that the Commission could not enforce these 
norms under the information-service paradigm. See Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. 
Cir. 2010); Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Indeed, at the time Brand X was de-
cided, the Commission had already enforced network neutrality norms against an internet ac-
cess provider, settling, for $15,000, allegations that it had blocked access to a competing Voice 
Over IP telephony service provider. See Madison River Commc’ns, LLC, 20 FCC Rcd. 4295 
(2005) (Order). 
 48. USTA II, 855 F.3d at 426 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en 
banc). 
 49. See, e.g., Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S. 327, 347 
(2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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“information service,” the Supreme Court said that Chevron’s usual rules ap-
plied. But when it answered “telecommunications service,” Kavanaugh sug-
gested that the classification question was too significant for deference to 
apply. Indeed, as noted, Kavanaugh expressly acknowledged this asymmetry, 
stating plainly that the major questions limitation on Chevron applies only 
when an agency offers a “regulatory” answer—but not, as was the case in 
Brand X, a putatively deregulatory one. 
One might wonder whether it was a major step for the FCC to impose even 
light-touch “information services” regulation on Internet service providers. 
The answer is no . . . . The FCC’s light-touch regulation did not entail 
common-carrier regulation and was not some major new regulatory step of 
vast economic and political significance. The rule at issue in Brand X there-
fore was an ordinary rule, not a major rule. As a result, the Chevron doc-
trine applied, not the major rules doctrine. 50 
Stated in Walters’s terms, Justice Kavanaugh has suggested that the major 
questions doctrine may help to address a possible Type I error (here, the 
view that Congress did not mean for broadband carriage to fall within the 
Commission’s authority over telecommunications services) but not a Type II 
error (the view that Congress did mean for the service to continue to fall 
within the Commission’s authority over telecommunications services).51 
II. SYMMETRY AND NEUTRALITY 
Then-Judge Kavanaugh’s dissental in USTA suggests an additional ex-
ample of asymmetry in administrative law, alongside the many others Wal-
ters catalogues in Symmetry’s Mandate. And this example, too, is significant 
for its normative implications, both as applied to network neutrality specifi-
cally and more generally. Communications scholars disagree over the import 
and effect of the Commission’s network neutrality rules. Some—even some 
network neutrality proponents—see the policy primarily as a wealth-
allocation device, shifting profits from broadband carriers (companies like 
Comcast and Verizon) and assigning them, instead, to content providers 
(companies like Facebook, Google, and Netflix).52 Others (myself included) 
see it as a competition-, democracy-, and speech-enhancing rule that, among 
other things, mitigates concerns over potentially anticompetitive and anti-
democratic behavior while preserving the internet’s opportunities to advance 
both free speech and new innovation. But no matter how one views the net-
work neutrality rule, then-Judge Kavanaugh’s asymmetric application of the 
major questions doctrine to the Commission’s decision seems to make little 
sense. 
 
 50. USTA II, 855 F.3d at 425 n.5 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing 
en banc). See supra note 47 (explaining that Judge Kavanaugh’s characterization is inaccurate, 
even on its own terms). 
 51. See Deacon, supra note 7. 
 52. See infra notes 53–54. 
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A. Network Neutrality as Wealth Transfer 
I begin by adopting, arguendo, the view that network neutrality regula-
tion is little more than a wealth-allocation device. Even some advocates of 
network neutrality rules have suggested that broadband carriers (like Com-
cast and Verizon) and content providers (like Facebook and Netflix) are 
“complements of each other in a hugely lucrative business, and the network 
neutrality debates are nothing more than an argument about how to share 
the proceeds.”53 Critics have likewise characterized network neutrality as a 
mere “battle over the allocation of economic rents.”54 Under this view, advo-
cates and critics agree that bandwidth is a resource that someone must pay 
for. Comcast, for example, might bear the initial expenses of upgrading an 
internet access network and then make that additional bandwidth available 
to whoever needs it (say, Google) at no additional charge (over and above 
the subscription fees paid by Comcast’s retail consumers). Alternately, 
Google might find that its services are being delivered too slowly, and so it 
might pay Comcast to upgrade its facilities, reserving the additional capacity 
for itself (and thereby freeing the extant bandwidth for other applications, 
like Netflix). Hence, when bandwidth is scarce, either its suppliers (broad-
band carriers) or its consumers (say, content providers) might pay for new 
capacity. But network neutrality rules foreclose the latter route, on the theo-
ry, in part, that robust competition among content providers—competition 
unimpeded by the barriers that the carriers’ termination fees would present, 
or by practices favoring the carriers’ own affiliated services—will best grow 
consumer demand for such content as well as for the bandwidth necessary to 
deliver it. Supply will follow that demand. 
Hence, network neutrality rules have the practical effect of assigning 
such infrastructure costs to broadband carriers: Whenever, say, Comcast 
chooses to upgrade its network facilities, it must do so out of its own coffers 
and recoup those expenses (if at all) from its own retail customers. 
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Likewise, the Commission’s decision to rescind network neutrality rules 
has the practical effect of assigning these infrastructure costs to content pro-
viders: Whenever, say, Netflix finds that it requires more capacity to deliver 
video content to consumers, Comcast (for example) can demand that Netflix 
pay for that capacity, and Netflix can recoup those expenses (if at all) from 
its own subscribers. 
In short, if network neutrality rules are best viewed as a wealth-
allocation policy, then any network neutrality policy choice is wealth alloca-
tive, no matter whether the rules exist or do not exist. It is as much a policy 
choice to rescind the rules as it is to promulgate them. If the rules exist, then 
content providers reap the rewards; but if the rules do not exist, then broad-
band carriers benefit. 
Such an analysis, moreover, applies to a wide range of agency action. 
Agencies, after all, do not issue rules punitively but in order (in many cases) 
to assign costs to a cheap cost avoider (so that the rule’s benefits outweigh its 
costs).55 Consider, for example, a pollution control statute. An agency might 
issue a regulation imposing significant costs on, say, coal-fired power plants. 
Alternately, the agency might rescind (or decline to impose in the first in-
stance) that same rule, thereby imposing the substantial costs of pollution on 
the public.56 No matter which path the agency chooses—nonregulation, reg-
ulation, or deregulation—the agency’s policy choice is of similar effect, im-
posing the costs of its decision on some affected population. 
Against this backdrop, then-Judge Kavanaugh’s claim that the major 
questions doctrine applies to imposition of network neutrality rules (but not 
to their rescission) is odd. In either case, the Commission’s policy choice is a 
regulatory step of similar significance.57 Indeed, the scalar value of the eco-
nomic consequence seems roughly the same, no matter whether its vector 
points in the direction of broadband carriers or content providers.58 If the 
rule is major, then it should be major no matter whether it imposes these 
rules or whether it rescinds them, no matter whether it imposes those costs 
on carriers or on content providers. Such symmetry draws from Step Zero’s 
basic premise: Step Zero (and the major questions doctrine) asks whether 
Congress has delegated certain policy choices to the agency. Assuming such 
a delegation—in this instance, assuming the power to choose between the 
telecommunications and information-service designations—the Step Zero 
inquiry is neutral as between the available choices. Once Congress has dele-
gated power to the agency, it is up to the agency to give its best answer. In 
short, the major questions doctrine is about major policy choices, not major 
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policy outcomes.59 Given a major policy question, any outcome is major. 
And given an ordinary policy question, as in Brand X, any outcome is ordi-
nary. 
This, of course, was not then-Judge Kavanaugh’s view. He offered no ra-
tionale for a rule that operates, instead, at the level of the regulatory out-
come, favoring, in this instance, one large industry (broadband carriers) over 
another (content providers). In my view, there isn’t one.60 Indeed, this 
asymmetry seems, instead, to breach the ideal that such matters of “interpre-
tation should be neutral, impartial, and predictable.”61 
B. Network Neutrality as a Coordination Device 
The defects in then-Judge Kavanaugh’s approach to the major questions 
doctrine loom even larger when taking a broader view of network neutrali-
ty’s purpose. After all, former Chairman Powell did not explain the need for 
network neutrality rules by way of a subsidy to content providers. Rather, as 
noted, those rules were meant to insure “against the potential rise of abusive 
market power by vertically integrated providers,” and moreover, to confer 
“[p]ower to the [p]eople” by freeing consumers from carrier “interference.”62 
Hence, the wealth-allocation view of network neutrality is rather incom-
plete. Rather, like other competition policy principles, network neutrality 
helps to prevent the aggrandization of power in vertically integrated com-
munications providers by reallocating the coordination rights that are typi-
cally vested in such firms and by granting them to consumers, who may 
select the content and applications of their choice without regard to that 
content’s status as affiliated (or not) with the facilities owner.63 In short, 
network neutrality limits the extent to which Comcast (for example) can fa-
vor its own proprietary video service at the expense of both external compet-
itors and, importantly, consumers who prefer those outside providers. 
Without network neutrality rules, firms are free to favor affiliated entities at 
the expense of both putative competitors and consumer preferences. AT&T 
might, as a broadband carrier, grant various advantages to affiliated content 
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providers (including, say, HBO).64 This is so even where consumers would 
prefer to watch Netflix instead of HBO (an AT&T affiliate) or Peacock 
(Comcast’s service). In many regions, this is because broadband carriers’ 
service terms are not disciplined by competition: Many consumers only have 
access to one wireline broadband carrier.65 Moreover, even where competi-
tion exists, switching is not frictionless: It can be onerous to cancel service 
from one carrier and provision service from another. And so, even where 
competition exists, carriers may be able to impose incremental burdens on 
consumers that do not exceed switching costs.66 The Commission’s network 
neutrality rules helped to curb this “gatekeeper” power.67 
In total, in this two-sided market (where broadband carriers serve both 
content providers and retail consumers), the costs or benefits of a network 
neutrality–related policy decision are borne, as explained above, by broad-
band carriers and content providers—and also retail consumers.68 Stated 
simply, any policy choice gives rise to important effects on all three of these 
interested constituencies. 
This is notable for several reasons. 
For one, network neutrality rules reduce the burdens that consumers 
might otherwise face to using their preferred internet-based services. Stated 
similarly, without network neutrality rules, carriers might nudge consumers 
to use services that they actually like less. If, for example, AT&T makes HBO 
free but Netflix costly, consumers may watch HBO, even if they’d rather 
watch Netflix’s content. And the lost value of the difference in preference 
presents a regressive burden on consumers; it is a greater proportional harm 
to the average retail consumer. Indeed, the absence of network neutrality 
rules may be felt most acutely by historically marginalized populations.69 
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Hence, network neutrality rules vest decisional power in consumers. As 
described above, the carriers’ influence over internet traffic may allow them 
to distort market outcomes. To stay with the same example, AT&T can give 
HBO an advantage over Netflix, notwithstanding a true preference for Net-
flix—especially in regions where AT&T faces little to no competition, or 
where switching from AT&T is costly or difficult. But network neutrality 
rules return that decisional power to consumers, who otherwise have few 
mechanisms to make their preferences known. In short, network neutrality 
rules ensure that consumers have a voice in the market for internet-enabled 
services, where exit from the broadband-carriage market is impractical.70 
Justice Kavanaugh’s suggestion, making it more difficult for the Commission 
to select a network neutrality–friendly regulatory classification, thus both is 
inconsistent with Step Zero’s focus on congressional intent to delegate deci-
sional authority and also tends to “amplif[y]” the “well-known concerns re-
garding agency capture and the collective action problems that hinder 
organization around interests shared by the public at large.”71 
Finally, network neutrality is a policy that has broad popular support 
across the ideological spectrum.72 But an asymmetric approach to the major 
questions doctrine would exert legal pressure on agencies to choose an inter-
pretation that “favors its regulated entities” (and to avoid a classification de-
cision that “disfavor[s] its regulated entities”), notwithstanding 
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countervailing political pressures.73 Where Chevron explains its rule of man-
datory deference by reference to political-accountability values—requiring 
agencies to justify their policy choices to the political branches and the vot-
ing public—then-Judge Kavanaugh’s application of the major questions doc-
trine undermines such values by putting a thumb on the scale in favor of 
deregulation—even where an agency’s politics and expertise point in another 
direction. 
CONCLUSION 
As described above, Symmetry’s Mandate offers a compelling account of 
an asymmetry in the practice of administrative law, one that appears to favor 
deregulation over regulation. Justice Kavanaugh’s proposed approach to the 
major questions doctrine—proposed during his tenure on the D.C. Circuit 
and in response to the Obama Administration’s decision to promulgate en-
forceable network neutrality rules—fits that mold. But this approach, like the 
others that Walters highlights, makes little sense. Justice Kavanaugh’s ap-
proach treats analogous wealth transfers—between industries, or between 
industries and the public—dissimilarly, and it does so in favor of regulated 
industries, putting outsiders and the public at a distinct disadvantage in the 
regulatory process. In short, his approach conflicts with Step Zero’s founda-
tional focus on congressional intent, pays little mind to capture and collec-
tive action–related concerns, and undermines agency expertise and 
accountability values. The judiciary should thus reject Justice Kavanaugh’s 
doctrinal suggestion in favor of a more, well, neutral application of the major 
questions doctrine. 
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